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Abstract
The notion of Universal Designated Verifier Signature
(UDVS), introduced by Steinfeld et al. in Asiacrypt 2003,
allows any holder of a signature to convince any designated verifier that the signer indeed generated the signature without revealing the signature itself, while the
verifier cannot transfer the proof to convince anyone else
of this fact. Such signature schemes can protect the privacy of signature holders and have applications in certification systems. Very recently, as pointed out by Baek
et al. in Asiacrypt 2005, one significant inconvenience of
all existing UDVS schemes is that they require the designated verifier to create a public key using the signer’s
public key parameter and have it certified to ensure the
resulting public key is compatible with the setting that
the signer provided. This is unrealistic in some situations
where the verifier is not willing to go through such setup
process. Baek et al. introduced the concept of Universal Designated Verifier Signature Proof (UDVSP) to solve
this problem. In this paper, we first introduce the idea of
identity-based (ID-based) UDVSP system. Furthermore,
we point out that the algorithm “Signature Transformation ST ” of the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. can be
eliminated, which results in a more efficient UDVSP system. We present two ID-based UDVSP systems based on
bilinear pairings, and provide the security proofs of our
systems in the random oracle model.
Keywords: Bilinear pairings, identity-based systems, universal designated verifier signature proof

1

Introduction

There are a plenty of researches on the conflict between
authenticity (non-repudiation) and privacy (controlled
verifiability) in the digital signatures. Undeniable signature, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [5], is
such a kind of digital signature which enables the signer
to decide when his/her signature can be verified. In some
applications, it is important for the signer to decide not
only when but also by whom her signature can be veri-

fied. For example, the voting center presents a proof to
convince a certain voter that his vote was counted without letting him to convince others (e.g., a coercer) of his
vote, which is important to design a receipt-free electronic
voting scheme preventing vote buying and coercion. This
is the motivation of the concept of Designated Verifier
Signature (DVS) [10]. The signer can provide a proof to
convince the designated verifier that he indeed signed a
message. However, the designated verifier cannot present
the proof to convince any third party because he is fully
capable of generating the same proof by himself.
Steinfeld et al. [14] introduced the concept of Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS), which can
be viewed as an extended notion of DVS. UDVS allows
any holder of the signature (not necessarily the signer)
to designate the signature to any desired designated verifier. The verifier can be convinced that the signer indeed
generated the signature, but cannot transfer the proof to
convince any third party of this fact. UDVS can protect
the privacy of signature holders and have applications in
certification systems. Recently, Lipmaa et al. [11] pointed
out some security flaws of some DVS schemes and presented a new stronger security notion for DVS.
Very recently, as pointed out by Baek et al. [4] in Asiacrypt 2005, one significant inconvenience of all existing
UDVS schemes is that they require the designated verifier
to create private/public key pairs using the same public
key parameter that has been set by the signer and have
been certified. This is unrealistic in some situations, for
example, the verifier have created his/her certified private/public key pairs using the public key parameter different from that of the signer. We argue that the verifier
will be less likely to create another certified private/public
key pairs using the public key parameter set by the signer
just only to verify a signature of the signer because this
key setup involving Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) may
incur significant cost. Baek et al. introduced the concept
of Universal Designated Verifier Signature Proof (UDVSP) to solve this problem. UDVSP also achieves all the
properties of UDVS. The main difference between UDVS
and UDVSP is that in UDVS the signature holder himself
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provides a proof using the verifier’s public key to convince
the verifier that the signer indeed generated the signature,
while in UDVSP the signature holder performs an interactive protocol together with the verifier to convince him
of the fact. The verifier’s key pair will not be involved in
such a proof, even the verifier need not have a key pair
in UDVSP. Therefore, UDVSP is a good substitute for
UDVS in some applications.
Steinfeld et al.’s UDVS schemes [14, 15] were constructed under certificate-based (CA-based) public key
systems. Identity-based (ID-based) systems [13] simplify
key management procedure and can be a good alternative
for CA-based systems, especially when efficient key management and moderate security are required. Zhang et al.
[16] proposed the concept of ID-based UDVS, where the
public key of the user is his/her identity. However, it is
also required that the designated verifier creates the certified public/private key pair using the same public key
parameter as that of the signer. That is to say, the signature holder uses the verifier’s public key (identity) to
generate a proof to convince that the signer indeed generated a signature, which can be verified by the signer’s
identity and the verifier’s private key.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we first introduce
the concept of ID-based UDVSP. Our contribution is two
folds: 1. We provide a formal model and security notions for ID-based UDVSP and then propose a concrete
construction of ID-based UDVSP based on Hess signature. We prove our construction achieves the desired security notions in the random oracle model. 2. We point
out that the algorithm “Signature Transformation ST ” of
the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. [4] can be eliminated,
i.e., we can present a more efficient UDVSP system. We
then present an efficient ID-based UDVSP system based
on Cha-Cheon signature scheme and provide the formal
security proof.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Some preliminaries are given in Section 2. The formal definition
and security notions for ID-based UDVSP are given in
Section 3. The proposed ID-based UDVSP system based
on Hess signature and its security analysis are given in
Section 4. In Section 5, we propose a more efficient UDVSP system and extend it to ID-based one. Finally, conclusions will be made in Section 6.

2
2.1

2) Non-degenerate: There exists P and Q ∈ G1 such
that e(P, Q) 6= 1.
3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G1 .
Definition 1. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well
as aP, bP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b ∈ Zq ), compute abP .
Definition 2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
(DDHP): Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as
aP, bP, cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Zq ), to
decide whether c ≡ ab mod q.
We call G a gap Diffie-Hellman group if DDHP can be
solved in polynomial time but there is no polynomial time
algorithm to solve CDHP with non-negligible probability.
Such groups can be found in supersingular elliptic curve
or hyperelliptic curve over finite field, and the bilinear
pairings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairings.
For more details, see [1, 6, 8].
Throughout the rest of this paper we define G1 be a
cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a
prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q. A bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → G2 . Define
three cryptographic secure hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ →
G1 , H1 : G1 ×{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and h : {0, 1}∗ ×G2 → Z∗q ×Z∗q .
Definition 3. One More Discrete Logarithm Problem: The definition of “One More Discrete Logarithm”
(OMDL) problem is introduced by Bellare [3]. Formally,
the experiment for this problem can be described as follows
[4]:
• Experiment: Let SP = (q, P, e, G1 , G2 , k) be the
system parameters.
A polynomial-time attacker
A makes m queries to the challenge oracle C()
and n queries to the DL oracle DLq,P (). Let
(s1 , s2 , · · · , sn ) ←− AC(),DLq,P () (SP ).
• Output: If (g s1 = h1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ (g sm = hm ), where
h1 , · · · hm are random points in G1 output by the challenge oracle C(), and n < m, where n denotes the
number of queries to the DL oracle, then return 1.
Otherwise, return 0.
We say that OMDL problem is hard if the advantage of
A in the above experiment is negligible in k.

Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings

Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose
order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group
of the same order q. Let a and b be elements of Z∗q . We
assume that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in
both G1 and G2 are hard. A bilinear pairing is a map
e : G1 × G1 → G2 with the following properties:
1) Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab
G1 , a, b ∈ Zq .
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2.2

ID-based Setting from Pairings

The ID-based public key cryptosystems allow some public
information of the user such as name, address and email
etc., rather than an arbitrary string to be used as his
public key. The private key of the user is calculated by
PKG (Private Key Generator) and sent to the user via a
secure channel.
ID-based public key setting from bilinear pairings can
for all P, Q ∈
be implemented as follows:
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• Setup: PKG chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and
set Ppub = sP. The center publishes systems parameters params = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub , H}, and keep s
as the master-key, which is known only by himself.
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generated from the valid signature σ obtained from
˜ The output of
the signer, with the knowledge of sk.
the protocol is either accept or reject.

• Extract: A user submits his/her identity informa- 3.2 Security Requirements
tion ID to PKG. PKG computes QID = H(ID), and There are two essential requirements for ID-based UDreturns SID = sQID to the user as his/her private VSP system. One is that a signature created by the signer
key.
should be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attack and ID attack. This is similar to the propof “PV-Unforgeability” in UDVS scheme [14]. The
3 ID-based Universal Designated erty
other is resistance against impersonation attack. That is,
UDVSP system should prevent an attacker who does not
Verifier Signature Proof
hold a valid signature created by the signer from impersonating the honest designator who holds a valid signature
3.1 Definitions
created by the signer [4].
There are four parties involved in the ID-based UDVSP
This impersonation attack can be divided into two catsystem: a PKG, a signer, a designator (signature holder),
egories, “Type-1” and “Type-2” attacks. In Type-1 ata designated verifier. The PKG first generates the private
tack, an attacker who has obtained a transformed signakey for the signer. The signer then signs a message and
ture participates in the VP protocol as a cheating desigsecurely transmits the resulting signature together with
nated verifier and interacts with an honest designator a
the message to the designator. After obtained the valid
number of times. The attacker then tries to impersonate
signature from the signer, the designator creates a transthe honest designator to other honest designated verifier.
formed signature by generating a random mask and hiding
In Type-2 attack, the attacker simply ignores the transthe original signature using it. The designator then conformed signature that he has obtained before but tries to
vinces the designated verifier via an interactive protocol
create a new transformed signature on his own and use
that the transformed signature has been generated from
this to impersonate the honest designator to an honest
the valid signature obtained from the signer.
designated verifier in the VP protocol. About the forDefinition 4. (ID-based UDVSP:) An ID-based UD- mal definition for security against the Type-1 and Type-2
VSP system consists of the following five polynomial-time attacks, please refer to [4].
In UDVSP system, the property of “DValgorithms and a proof:
Unforgeability” [14] is not considered, which requires
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input that it is difficult for an attacker to forge a DV-signature
a security parameter k, outputs the common system σ̃ ∗ by the signer on a new message m∗ , such that the pair
parameters Params and the master-key mk of PKG. (m∗ , σ̃ ∗ ) passes the DV-verification test. This prevents
attacks to fool the designated verifier, possibly mounted
• Key Extraction KE: On input Params, master-key by a dishonest designator. However, we remark that this
mk, and a user’s identity information ID as the pub- attack can be included in the Type-2 attack, if we think
lic key pk, outputs the corresponding private key sk. the dishonest designator (attacker) impersonates himself
• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret key to fool the honest designated verifier.
sks of the signer S and a message m, outputs a signature σ on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key pks = IDs , the message m and the signature σ,
outputs either accept or reject.

4

ID-based UDVSP System Based
on Hess Signature

4.1

The Proposed System

• Signature Transformation ST : On input the pub- Our proposed ID-based UDVSP system is based on Hess
lic key pks of S, the signature σ and a secret mask signature scheme [9]. Each sub-algorithm and protocol of
˜ outputs a transformed signature σ̃ using sk.
˜
sk,
this system can be described as follows:
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: This is an
interactive verification protocol between a signature
holder SH and a designated verifier DV . Common
inputs for SH and DV are the signer’s public key
pks , a transformed signature σ̃ and the message m.
˜ used to creSH’s private input is the secret mask sk
ate σ̃. DV does not have any private input. In this
protocol, SH tries to convince DV that σ̃ has been

• System Parameters Generation PG: On input a
security parameter k, outputs the system parameters
Params = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1 } and the
PKG’s master-key mk = x.
• Key Extraction KE: On input Params, the masterkey x, and an identity information ID, outputs the
corresponding private key SID = xH(ID).
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• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key SIDs of the signer, a message m and a random
element Q ∈R G1 , the signer computes r = e(Q, P ),
(λ, µ) = h(m, r), and V = λSIDs + µQ. Outputs a
signature σ = (r, V ) on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public key IDs , the message m and the signature σ.
Let (λ, µ) = h(m, r), if the equation e(V, P ) =
e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ holds, outputs accept; otherwise, output reject.

Let the signed message is m, B randomly chooses four
integers d, e, λ, µ ∈R Zq and sets H(IDs ) = dP , r =
e(P, P )e , and h(m, r) = (λ, µ). B then computes V 0 =
(λxd + µe)S0 and sends A a transformed signature σ̃ =
(r, V 0 ).
B proceeds to simulate n times of the execution of the
VP protocol between Ṽ and an honest designator P as
follows:
Make a query to C and get the response Si , here i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}. Compute ai = e((λxd + µe)P, Si ) and send
it to Ṽ . When Ṽ sends ci , make query Si +ci S0 to DLq,P ()

• Signature Transformation ST : On input the to get the response ti . Ṽ
signer’s public key IDs , the signature σ and a ran- ai e(V 0 , P )ci .
dom integer z ∈R Z∗q , outputs a transformed signaNote that ai =
˜ = z.
ture σ̃ = (r, V 0 = zV ) and the secret mask sk
(e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )si ,
have
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: Both SH
and DV firstly compute (λ, µ) = h(m, r), ω1 = (e(H(ID ), P )λ rµ )ti
s
pub
e(V 0 , P ), and ω2 = e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ . They then
perform the following interactive protocol:
1) SH chooses a random integer α ∈R Z∗q and
sends a = ω2α to DV .

?

checks (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )ti =
(e(dP, Ppub )λ e(P, P )µe )si
=
and ti = si + ci s0 mod q, we
= (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )si +ci s0
= ai (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )ci s0
= ai e((λxd + µe)S0 , P )ci
= ai e(V 0 , P )ci

2) DV chooses c ∈R Z∗q and sends it to SH.

After performing the above simulation n times, B
3) SH computes t = α + cz mod q and sends t to now attempts to extract s0 . To do so, B runs P̃
to get a in Step 1 of VP protocol, selects c ∈R
DV .
Z and runs P̃ to obtain its response t and checks
c
t ?
4) DV checks ω2 = aω1 . If the equation holds, q
0
c
λ µ t ?
(e(H(ID
s ), Ppub ) r ) = ae(V , P ) . If so, B runs P̃
outputs accept; otherwise, outputs reject.
again with the same state as before but with differThe underlying signature scheme in the above ID- ent challenge c0 ∈R Zq , obtains its response t0 and
0
?
based UDVSP system is a standard Hess signature, so checks (e(H(ID ), P )λ rµ )t0 =
ae(V 0 , P )c . If so, we
s
pub
0
0
e(V, P ) = e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ holds. Also, in the prohave (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )t−t = e(V 0 , P )c−c , that is
tocol VP, note that ω1 = e(V 0 , P ) = e(V, P )z = ω2z ,
0
0
e(P, P )(λxd+µe)(t−t ) = e(P, P )(λxd+µe)s0 (c−c ) . Then we
therefore the equation ω2t = ω2α+cz = aω1c holds.
t−t0
obtain s0 = c−c
mod q. With s0 , we can compute all si
0
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.

4.2

Security Analysis

We prove that our proposed ID-based UDVSP system
achieves the desired security properties. Since the unforgeability of the Hess signature scheme [9] was proven
under the assumption that CDHP in G1 is hard, we only
analyze the security of the UDVSP system under the impersonation attacks.
Theorem 1. The ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess
signature is secure against impersonation under Type1 attack in the random oracle model [2] assuming that
OMDL problem is hard in G1 .

Theorem 2. The ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess
signature is secure against impersonation under Type-2
attack in the random oracle model assuming that CDHP
is hard in G1 .
Proof. Let A be an impersonator that tries to break
the ID-based UDVSP system based on Hess signature
under Type-2 attack. Let B be a forger that tries to
break the Cha-Cheon signature scheme under chosen
message attack. Suppose the B is given a public key
{G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, h}, where H : {0, 1}∗ →
G∗1 and h : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Z∗q × Z∗q are hash functions viewed as random oracles. Firstly, B outputs pk =
{G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, h} as the signer’s public
key. B then chooses an arbitrary string m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
B now runs A to get σ̃ = (r, V 0 ), continues to run
A to get a in step 1 of VP. Upon receiving a, B picks
c ∈R Z∗q , runs A to obtain its response t and checks

Proof. Let A = (Ṽ , P̃ ) be an impersonator that tries
to break the UDVSP system based on the Hess signature and B be an OMDL attacker. Suppose B is given
the system parameters {G1 , G2 , e, q}. First, B queries its
challenge oracle C to obtain a challenge point S0 = s0 P
for some unknown s0 ∈R Zq . B then randomly chooses
an integer x ∈R Zq and outputs the signer’s public
?
key pk = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, IDs , H, h}, where (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )t = ae(V 0 , P )c . If the equation
H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and h : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Z∗q × Z∗q are hash holds, B runs A again with same state as before but
functions viewed as random oracles.
with difference challenge c0 , obtains its response t0 and
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?

0

0

checks (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )t = ae(V 0 , P )c . If the equa0

0 c−c
t−t0

tion holds, B outputs (r, V
) as a forgery.
0
0
Note that e(V 0 , P )c−c = (e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ )t−t , we
have
c−c0
e(V 0 t−t0 , P ) = e(H(IDs ), Ppub )λ rµ .
c−c0

Therefore, (r, V 0 t−t0 ) is a valid Hess signature on message
m.

5

More Efficient ID-based UDVSP System

We observe that the algorithm “Signature Transformation
ST ” defined in [4] can be eliminated, i.e., we can present
a more efficient UDVSP system. In this section, we first
present the definition and the security notions for the new
more efficient UDVSP system, and then extend it to IDbased one.

5.1

56

For the secure requirements, we still consider the two
type of impersonation attacks. In Type-1 attack, an attacker participates in the VP protocol as a cheating designated verifier and interacts with an honest designator a
number of times. The attacker then tries to impersonate
the honest designator to other honest designated verifier.
In Type-2 attack, the attacker just create a new proof
to impersonate the honest designator to an honest designated verifier in the VP protocol.
Note that VP in our system is indeed a pairingbased honest verifier zero-knowledge proof [7] derived
from Schnorr signature scheme [12], which ensures DV
that SH knows the information of σ. Furthermore, due
to the property of pairings, σ must be the form of xH(m).
Therefore, even the Type-1 attacker interacts with an
honest designator a number of times, he can not know
any useful information to impersonate the honest designator to cheat an honest designated verifier. It means
that the advantage for Type-1 attacker to impersonate
the honest designator is same to that of Type-2 attacker.
So, in the following, we just consider the Type-2 attacker.

The New Definition and Security Notions
5.2

Efficient ID-based UDVSP System
Based on Cha-Cheon Signature

The new efficient UDVSP system only consists of three
polynomial algorithms and a proof: PG, SG, SV, and In the following we follow the above definition to present a
VP. As an example, we present the following UDVSP new ID-based UDVSP system based on Cha-Cheon signasystem based on BLS signature scheme [1]:
ture scheme [6]. We argue that we can give such a system
based on other ID-based signature schemes. Each sub• System Parameters Generation PG: On input
algorithm and protocol of this system can be described as
a security parameter k, outputs the system paramfollows:
eters Params = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, H}. Let the signer’s
private/public key pair be (x, y = xP ).
• System Parameters Generation PG: On input a
• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key x of the signer, and a message m, outputs the
signature σ = xH(m) on m.

security parameter k, outputs the system parameters
Params = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1 } and the
PKG’s master-key mk = x.

• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key y, the message m and the signature σ. If the
equation e(σ, P ) = e(H(m), y) holds, outputs accept;
otherwise, output reject.

• Key Extraction KE: On input Params, the masterkey x, and an identity information ID, outputs the
corresponding private key SID = xH(ID).

• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: The designator (SH) performs an interactive protocol with
the designated verifier as follows:
1) SH chooses a random element R ∈R G1 and
sends a = e(R, P ) to DV .
2) DV chooses c ∈R Z∗q and sends it to SH.
3) SH computes T = R + cσ and sends T to DV .
4) DV checks e(T, P ) = ae(H(m), y)c . If the equation holds, outputs accept; otherwise, output
reject.
Compare with Baek et al.’s UDVSP system based on
BLS signature scheme, our UDVSP system not only eliminates the algorithm of ST , but also improves the efficiency of VP.

• Signature Generation SG: On input the secret
key SIDs of the signer, a message m, and a random
integer r ∈R Z∗q , the signer computes U = rH(IDs ),
V = (r + H1 (U ||m))SIDs . Outputs a signature σ =
(U, V ) on m.
• Signature Verification SV: On input the public
key IDs , the message m and the signature σ, if the
equation e(V, P ) = e(U + H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ), Ppub )
holds, outputs accept; otherwise, outputs reject.
• Interactive Verification Protocol VP: Both SH
and DV perform the following interactive protocol:
1) SH chooses a random integer Q ∈R G1 and then
sends a = e(Q, P ), U to DV .
2) DV chooses c ∈R Z∗q and sends it to SH.
3) SH computes T = Q + cV and sends T to DV .
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4) DV checks e(T, P ) = ae(U + H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ), Acknowledgements
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References
?

5.3

Security Analysis

Theorem 3. The ID-based UDVSP system based on ChaCheon signature is secure against impersonation under
Type-2 attack in the random oracle model assuming that
CDHP is hard in G1 .
Proof. Let A be an impersonator that tries to break
the ID-based UDVSP system based on Cha-Cheon signature under Type-2 attack. Let B be a forger that
tries to break the Cha-Cheon signature scheme under
chosen message attack. Suppose the B is given a public key {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1 }, where H :
{0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H1 : G1 × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q are hash
functions viewed as random oracles [2]. Firstly, B outputs pk = {G1 , G2 , e, q, P, Ppub = xP, H, H1 } as the
signer’s public key. B then chooses an arbitrary string
m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
B now runs A to get (a, U ) in step 1 of VP. Upon receiving a, B picks c ∈R Z∗q , runs A to obtain its response T
?

and checks e(T, P ) = ae(U + H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ), Ppub )c . If
the equation holds, B runs A again with same state as before but with difference challenge c0 , obtains its response t0
0
?
and checks e(T 0 , P ) = ae(U + H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ), Ppub )c .
1
0
If the equation holds, B outputs (U, c−c
0 (T − T )) as a
forgery.
Note that e(T − T 0 , P ) = e(U + H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ),
0
Ppub )c−c , we have e((c − c0 )−1 (T − T 0 ), P ) = e(U +
1
0
H1 (U ||m)H(IDs ), Ppub ). Therefore, (U, c−c
0 (T − T )) is
a valid Cha-Cheon signature on message m.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we first provide a formal model and security notions for ID-based UDVSP and present a concrete construction based on Hess signature. Meanwhile,
we argue that the algorithm “Signature Transformation
ST ” of the UDVSP defined by Baek et al. can be eliminated, which results in a more efficient UDVSP system.
We then present an efficient ID-based UDVSP based on
Cha-Cheon signature scheme. Also, we prove our constructions achieve the desired security notions in the random oracle model.
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